The article discusses infinitism, the view that a belief is justified for a subject only if she possesses an infinite chain of available reasons for that belief. In its most recent and sophisticated version, the view allegedly escapes the problems that trouble its main competitors, foundationalism and coherentism, while avoiding the traditional objections which relegated it to a marginal place. The article argues that despite these improvements, sophisticated versions of infinitism face a pressing problem, viz. they are unable to appropriately (...) articulate propositional and doxastic justification. (shrink)

The article discusses infinitism, the view that a belief is justified for a subject only if she possesses an infinite chain of available reasons for that belief. In its most recent and sophisticated version, the view allegedly escapes the problems that trouble its main competitors, foundationalism and coherentism, while avoiding the traditional objections which relegated it to a marginal place. The article argues that despite these improvements, sophisticated versions of infinitism face a pressing problem, viz. they are unable to appropriately (...) articulate propositional and doxastic justification. (shrink)

Political communication in modern democratic societies often requires the speaker to address multiple audiences with heterogeneous values, interests and agendas. This creates an incentive for communication strategies that allow politicians to send, along with the explicit content of their speech, concealed messages that seek to secure the approval of certain groups without alienating the rest of the electorate. These strategies have been labeled dogwhistling in recent literature. In this article, we provide an analysis of overt intentional dogwhistling. We recognize two (...) main stages within the OIDs’ way of conveying a concealed message: the expression of a perspective together with the transmission of an accompanying positioning message vis-à-vis the OID targeted sub-audience, and the inferential extraction of a set of cognitive and non-cognitive contents inferred on the basis of the former stage. Furthermore, we identify three linguistic mechanisms whereby these contents may be transmitted: conventional meaning, conversational implicature and perlocutionary inferencing. Hence, on our view OIDs are not a uniform category, as they may differ as to what extent the concealed content is speaker-meant, and thus actually communicated by the speaker. (shrink)

In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ￢A) both A and ￢A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason (...) about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues’s interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality. (shrink)

In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In (...) the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers. (shrink)

It has been widely discussed, in recent years, which is the rational doxastic reaction in the face of peer disagreement. But not much has been said about aninteresting instance of that debate: philosophical peer disagreement. That is precisely what I will be concerned with in this paper. First, I will offer a definition ofphilosophical peer that introduces the idea of an epistemic perspective. The proposed definition allows for a doublé distinction: between Strong and Weak Peers, and between Strong and Weak (...) Disagreements. Based on these distinctions, I will defend that different doxastic reactions are required depending on the type of disagreement at issue. On the one hand, in the face of Weak Disagreement, we should be conciliatory. Cases of Strong disagreement, in turn, shouldn’t motívate a doxastic revision. In order to argue for that, some refinements into the notion of Rational Uniqueness will be needed. (shrink)

RESUMEN En primer lugar, se presenta el fenómeno de los desacuerdos básicos entre pares epistémicos y se argumenta que son relevantes y merecen atención. En segundo lugar, se discute el argumento estándar a favor del conciliacionismo. Finalmente, se defiende que las razones típicas para conciliar no se aplican en los desacuerdos básicos entre pares, de manera que en estos casos está permitido ser obstinado. ABSTRACT The article starts out by introducing the phenomenon of basic disagreements among epistemic peers and arguing (...) that they are relevant and deserve attention. Secondly, it discusses the standard argument in favor of conciliationism. Finally, it holds that the typical reasons for conciliating do not apply to basic disagreements among peers, so that in these cases it is possible to be obstinate. (shrink)

En primer lugar, se presenta el fenómeno de los desacuerdos básicos entre pares epistémicos (esto es, desacuerdos acerca de la naturaleza de la evidencia o el método apropiado para evaluarla) y se argumenta que son relevantes y merecen atención. En segundo lugar, se discute el argumento estándar a favor del conciliacionismo. Finalmente, se defiende que las razones típicas para conciliar no se aplican en los desacuerdos básicos entre pares, de manera que en estos casos está permitido ser obstinado.

Un agente está en un estado de akrasia epistémica moderada cuando cree que p y, simultáneamente, suspende el juicio sobre si su evidencia apoya p. En este artículo se argumenta que, dada cierta manera de entender la suspensión del juicio, un agente moderadamente acrático es doxásticamente irracional. En primer lugar, se introducen ciertos conceptos básicos para el argumento y se discute la dialéctica del debate. En segundo lugar, se elabora la conocida distinción entre racionalidad doxástica y racionalidad proposicional, y se (...) discuten algunos casos de fundación impropia desarrollados por Turri. En tercer lugar, se consideran dos posibles casos a partir de los cuales podría argumentarse que la akrasia epistémica moderada es doxásticamente racional y se argumenta que ninguno de ellos funciona. En cuarto lugar, se examinan varias objeciones a la propuesta. (shrink)

En el siguiente trabajo defenderé una postura contextualista respecto de los predicados evaluativos blandos, i.e. la idea de situar la perspectiva relevante dentro del contenido del enunciado. Sin embargo, mi propuesta se diferencia de otras posiciones contextualistas. Mostraré que una teoría que postule un enriquecimiento pragmático de los enunciados que involucran predicados evaluativos blandos es preferible a la opción indexicalista, que postula una variable oculta en la estructura gramatical profunda de la oración. Sostendré, en cambio, que enunciados como "Las manzanas (...) son deliciosas" varían su contenido de acuerdo al estándar de gusto relevante en el contexto de emisión debido a un proceso de modulación que ajusta el contenido semántico expresado por el predicado. Por último, argumentaré que no existe tal cosa como un desacuerdo sin falta más que en apariencia, contestando de esa manera la principal objeción relativista contra las posturas contextualistas. (shrink)

One of the main arguments in favor of metalinguistic predicativism is the uniformity argument. The article discusses one of its premises, according to which the Being Called Condition gives the literal meaning of proper names. First, the uniformity argument is presented. Second, the article examines a challenge by Jeshion and a recent response by Tayebi. It is then argued that Tayebi’s response is unsound. Finally, two sets of facts are discussed, which provide independent evidence against the literal meaning thesis.

In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to dropthe ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does (...) not consider it plays an evidential role. However, on “On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition For Epistemic Peerage,” Michele Palmira has developed some criticisms to these ideas. Here I defend my view from Palmira’s objections. (shrink)

Neutral Counterpart Theories of slurs hold that the truth-conditional contribution of a slur is the same as the truth-conditional contribution of its neutral counterpart. In, DiFranco argues that these theories, even if plausible for single-word slurs like ‘kike’ and ‘nigger’, are not suitable for complex slurs such as ‘slanty-eyed’ and ‘curry muncher’, figurative slurs like ‘Jewish American Princess’, or iconic slurring expressions like ‘ching chong’. In this paper, we argue that these expressions do not amount to genuine counterexamples to neutral (...) counterpart theories of slurs. We provide a positive characterization of DiFranco's examples that doesn't deviate from the core of those theories. (shrink)

The article addresses the question of how should scientific peers revise their beliefs (if at all) upon recognized disagreement. After presenting the basics of peer disagreement in sections 1 and 2, we focus, in section 3, on a concrete case of scientific disagreement, to wit, the dispute over the evidential status of randomized control trials in medical practice. The examination of this case motivates the idea that some scientific disagreements permit a steadfast reaction. In section 4, we support this conclusion (...) by providing a normative argument in the same direction; if we are correct, typical reasons for conciliation are absent in this kind of scientific disagreements. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article advances a multidimensional semantics for slurs, according to which they express a standard at-issue content along with a conventional implicature. By contrast with existent conventional implicature accounts (McCready, 2010), it is argued that the not at-issue content of slurs is a property, instead of a proposition. When complemented with a dynamic pragmatic framework (Portner, 2004), the view implies that an utterance containing a slur carries two different discursive functions, that is, it updates two different components of context: (...) the at-issue content updates the common ground; the not at-issue content updates the To-Do List. It is then showed how the view explains the way in which uses of slurs are capable of modifying permissibility facts and hence of bringing harm to their targets. Finally, the article shows how the present account deals with different conversational moves that slurs make available like those of propaganda, attack, complicity or appropriation. (shrink)

Philosophy of language has been witnessing for the last fifteen years or so, if not a turn, at least the rising of a new trend, with its usual methods applied to new non-semantic phenomena linked to language use in the context of politics, and with new methods arising from the distinctive features of the new subject matter. Among these phenomena, dogwhistles have taken somewhat of a center stage (other phenomena include ethnic slurs, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, propaganda and gender-inclusive language, (...) among others). This special issue is devoted to their study. In this brief introduction, we seek to succinctly review the key aspects of the phenomenon. First, we present some intuitive examples; second, we put forward a preliminary characterization of dogwhistles; then we discuss some of the main issues raised by these examples, as well as some basic notions found in the literature. We close by presenting an overview of the articles to be found in the current issue. (shrink)

Group‐based slurs are words that express derogatory attitudes toward some group demarcated by a property that has historically caused social antagonism, for example, gender or ethnicity, among others. Reclamation, in turn, is the process whereby a slur starts being used non‐derogatorily by members of the target group to express a positive attitude. Some content‐based theories of slurs (which pin the derogatory force of such terms on their conventional meaning) account for reclamation by arguing that it involves a change in meaning (...) so that reclaimed slurs are ambiguous. But these theories face a challenge, namely to account for the difference between reclaimed slurs and run‐of‐the‐mill ambiguous terms, whose felicitous uses do not seem to be restricted to in‐group speakers. In this article, we argue that the Reclamation Worry is not a problem for content‐based theories of slurs by advancing an account of reclamation that is compatible with such views. As we shall argue, such a theory must rely on the sociolinguistic dimension of such terms. (shrink)

El artículo se ocupa de la cuestión de los desacuerdos entre pares epistémicos. En primer lugar, se presenta una teoría al respecto que distingue entre desacuerdos fuertes y desacuerdos débiles. Dicha teoría es 'híbrida', en tanto prescribe una reacción conciliadora en un caso y una reacción obstinada en el otro. En segundo lugar, se presenta una objeción contra las posturas conciliadoras que amenaza la posición aquí defendida. De acuerdo con esta objeción, las posiciones conciliadoras prescriben en algunas circunstancias su propio (...) rechazo. Finalmente, se ofrecen varias razones por las cuales dicha objeción puede ser impugnada, resultando así inocua contra la posición defendida en este artículo. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Metafictive utterances raise a kind of intuitions that pose a problem for a view that combines a referentialist approach to proper names with an antirealist stance on fictional characters. In this article I attempt to provide a solution to this problem within the framework of mental files. According to my position, metafictive utterances literally express an incomplete proposition while pragmatically conveying a complete one, which accounts for the intuitions of truthfulness. The proposition pragmatically conveyed is ‘metarepresentational', I'll argue, in (...) the sense that it is about a mental representation or mental file. RESUMO As emissões metafictivas despertam intuições de verdade, as quais representam um problema para uma teoria que combine uma posição referencialista quanto aos nomes próprios com um compromisso antirrealista quanto às personagens de ficção. O objetivo deste artigo é proporcionar uma solução para este problema no âmbito da teoria de arquivos mentais. De acordo com a posição desenvolvida, enquanto as emissões metafictivas expressam literalmente uma proposição incompleta, comunicam pragmaticamente uma proposição completa, a qual explica as intuições de verdade. A proposição pragmaticamente comunicada, argumentarei, é "metarrepresentacional", no sentido de que é sobre uma representação mental ou arquivo mental. (shrink)

Moderate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment, moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically irrational. The paper starts with a brief introduction that makes explicit some background notions and clarifies the dialectics of the debate. Second, the well-known distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality is introduced and some (...) cases of improper basing are discussed. Third, two different cases are considered in which one might argue that moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically rational, and it is argued that none is successful. Fourth, several objections are presented and answered. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this review I discuss Stefano Predelli’s book Proper Names: A Millian Account. The book provides a defense of the traditional Millian view according to which proper names are non-indexical, rigid devices of direct reference. In addition, Predelli discusses some usual interpretations as misconceptions and it contests many common objections. I provide an overview of its chapters and consider some of its strengths and weaknesses.

En el artículo se traza una genealogía de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez, estructura sobre la que nació esta revista. Parte de una primera etapa desde su creación hasta 1948 (sus directores fueron Corts Grau y Gómez Arboleya), en la que se configuró como un aparato ideológico de la dictadura franquista: se trataba de dibujar una historia, buscar unos orígenes donde anclar la legitimidad del nuevo Estado. Tras un paréntesis de poca actividad, la siguiente etapa, 1957-1967 (director Asís Garrote), fue (...) un intento de apertura más allá de la escolástica, editándose a partir de 1961 los Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez. Finalmente, en la última etapa (1967-1985), con la llegada de López Calera a la Universidad de Granada, se produce un cambio de orientación: se abandonaron los objetivos fundacionales, dejando de ser un aparato ideológico del franquismo para convertirse, por medio de la revista, en una atalaya desde donde divisar las corrientes y problemáticas actuales en la Filosofía del Derecho. (shrink)

El presente escrito se propone a partir del análisis de los trabajos de Francisco Leocata sobre la historia de las ideas filosóficas en la Argentina distinguir tres líneas de fuerza o bien tres modos de hacer filosofía en armonía con la fe cristiana. Dos de ellos presentes ya desde los comienzos en la época de la colonia, y entrando progresivamente en disputa; un tercero que se perfila en el marco del llamado pensamiento latinoamericano. Para ello, será necesario elucidar primeramente (...) dos presupuestos, a saber, qué entiende el autor por filosofía cristiana y por qué es importante distinguir modernidad de ilustración. A partir de allí, seguirá una reseña histórica crítica de pensadores argentinos en mayor o menor medida afines al cristianismo que se clasificarán por su rechazo o apoyo a las ideas de la modernidad/ilustración. Finalmente, se sugiere reconocer como derivación de estas reflexiones una tercera posición en el pensamiento de Juan Carlos Scannone. (shrink)

Tras la publicacion de los aforismos completos de su obra magna, Escolios a un texto implicito, Atalanta presenta ahora el segundo libro que aparecio en vida de Nicolas Gomez Davila. Publicado en 1959 en Bogota, bajo el sobrio titulo de Textos I, este volumen tiene la particularidad, dentro del conjunto de su obra publicada, de ser el unico escrito en prosa continua. Asi pues, el lector puede aqui saborear en toda su extension la eficaz calidad de su estilo. Pero aparte (...) del placer sensual que reporta la prosa de Gomez Davila, este libro ofrece una clave esencial de su pensamiento, pues segun Francisco Pizano de Brigard, en el se encuentra todo el desarrollo de su teoria de la reaccion: el texto implicito al que aluden los Escolios, donde se exponen, sin ningun proposito didactico, las lineas esenciales de su vision antropologica y metafisica del hombre. Cierra el volumen la recuperacion de un breve texto perdido, El reaccionario autentico, que completa y sintetiza su vision filosofica del mundo, que lejos de ser una exposicion dialectica del universo, es el lucido llamamiento de una libertad despierta a una libertad dormida. (shrink)

Este escrito es un primer intento de estudio de la presencia del pensamiento de Ramon Llull en la Nueva Granada. Son dos las partes que conforman este estudio. Primero, un comentario al catálogo de libros impresos entre los siglos XVI y XVIII, que se encuentran en dos bibliotecas en Bogotá : la Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia y la Biblioteca de Teología de la Universidad Javeriana. Segundo, un breve recuento de ciertos o presuntos lulistas que hicieron presencia en la Nueva Granada, (...) en especial de fray Juan de santa Gertrudis, fray Francisco de Soto y Marne y Juan Martínez de Ripalda. (shrink)

In this paper I explore whether three different approaches to connexivity – namely, Lewis and Langford’s, Wansing’s and Egré and Politzer’s – can be non-trivially related. Lewis and Langford’s approach consists of the definition of the conditional in terms of consistency via the definition of possibility in terms of consistency and Lewis’ definition of the (strict) conditional in terms of possibility; Wansing’s approach is based on his definition of the falsity condition for the conditional as “if A is true then (...) B is false”; Egré and Politzer’s approach relies on the modalization of the falsity condition for the conditional in its conditional form (A→◇~B). With this background in mind, I build upon Estrada-González’s work relating connexivism and possibilism, the thesis according to which everything is possible. Estrada-González’s work relates Lewis and Langford’s connexive approach with Nelson’s idea that every proposition is self-consistent. He does so using a fragment of LP augmented with a special conditional. This relation has resulted in the study and postulation of several truth-functional modalities, some of which have already been discussed elsewhere. I employ several truth-functional modalities to evaluate Egré and Politzer’s falsity conditions for the conditional. I show that in using Béziau’s truth-functional modality ◇B, definable in Estrada-González’s framework, one can retain in a single framework the three different approaches. More specifically, distinguishing the notion of logical equivalence from the notion of interderivability and these two from the notion of coimplication, it is possible to relate ~(A→B) and (A→◇~B) as interderivable schemas and in a valid biconditional. I also show some consequences of this for Béziau’s negative appraisal of three-valued truthfunctional modalities. (shrink)

En este artículo discutimos la tesis de Jc Beall según la cual no hay negación lógica. Evaluamos la solidez del argumento con el que defiende su tesis y presentamos dos razones para rechazar una de sus premisas: que la negación tiene que ser excluyente o exhaustiva. La primera razón involucra una presentación alternativa de las reglas de la negación en sistemas de secuentes diferentes al que Beall presupone. La segunda razón establece que la negación no tiene que ser excluyente o (...) exhaustiva. (shrink)

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, not sufficiently explored in (...) the connexive literature yet.We offer a characterization of connexive negation disentangled from the cancellation account of negation, a previous attempt to define connexivity on top of a distinctive negation. We also discuss an ancient view on connexive logics, according to which a valid implication is one where the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent, and discuss the role of our idea of connexive negation for this kind of view. (shrink)

Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, not sufficiently explored in (...) the connexive literature yet.We offer a characterization of connexive negation disentangled from the cancellation account of negation, a previous attempt to define connexivity on top of a distinctive negation. We also discuss an ancient view on connexive logics, according to which a valid implication is one where the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent, and discuss the role of our idea of connexive negation for this kind of view. (shrink)

Este ensayo estudia la actitud asumida por Francisco Suárez frente al pensamiento de Nicolás Maquiavelo y la razón de Estado, en el marco de los estudios históricos sobre el pensamiento español de los siglos xvi y xvii (Maravall, Tierno Galván, Fernández Santamaría), los cuales han establecido una distinción entre autores “tácitos mayores” y “tácitos menores”, tradicionalistas e innovadores, “moralistas” y “arbitristas”. En el estudio se examinan dos tesis: la más radical de Carlo Giacon, quien contrapone el pensamiento del (...) Teólogo de Coimbra al del Secretario florentino, y la más ponderada de Cintia Faraco, que vislumbra cierto nexo entre la prudencia maquiavélica y la suareciana. A juicio del Autor, el problema se resuelve desde su raíz teniendo en cuenta que la ley del Príncipe debe ser siempre justa y recta, es decir, conforme a valores éticos, particularmente, a los expresados en la ley natural. (shrink)

Cuand o l a edició n d e est e númer o d e lo s Anale s d e l a Cáted r a F r ancisc o Suá r e z estab a a punt o d e ce r rars e no s so r prendi ó e l f allecimient o d e fo r m a repentina e inesperad a d e Nicolá s Lópe z Calera , Directo r d e est a pu b (...) licació n durant e más d e cuarent a años . P ar a tod o e l equip o editoria l qu e fo r mamo s pa r t e d e lo s A CFS s u mue r t e h a signi f icad o un a pérdid a i r repara b l e po r l a huell a imbo r ra b l e qu e su labo r académic a y dedicació n un i v ersitari a h a dejad o entr e todo s nosotros. (shrink)

Nicolás, esta entrevista pretende ser un estímulo para que, al hilo de unas cuantas preguntas, expongas algunos aspectos de tu pensamiento y de tu trayectoria intelectual. La conmemoración de los cincuenta años de existencia de los Anales coincide aproximadamente con el momento de tu jubilación. Tú has dirigido la revista durante la mayor parte de este tiempo y, desde luego, has sido un testigo importante de la evolución de la filosofía jurídica durante ese periodo, además de haber participado directamente (...) en ella y de haber protagonizado algunos de sus momentos de mayor relieve. Por el interés que suscita tu propia obra, y por el interés que suscita esa obra y sus vicisitudes en el contexto político e intelectual en el que se ha desarrollado, te agradecemos que hayas aceptado contestar estas preguntas. Estamos seguros de que tus respuestas, la información que proporciones a los lectores, y la reflexión que tal vez te induzcan a realizar, serán de grandísima utilidad para todos los que cultivan la filosofía del derecho. (shrink)

Traditionally, the field of science and technology studies (STS) considered the scientific laboratory as the central site of knowledge production and technological development. While providing rich analyses of the social construction of scientific knowledge and the role of non-human actors, STS scholars have often neglected the university – the very context in which laboratories themselves are embedded – as a relevant object of research. In this paper, we argue for re-introducing the university as a relevant category and object of analysis (...) by using the notion of epistemic virtues to link epistemic culture – traditionally the focus of STS – and epistemic structure – traditionally the focus of higher education studies. Advancing this line of argumentation, we make three analytical moves. First, we explore academic freedom as a specific version of negative liberty that extends beyond disciplinary boundaries. We suggest that academics continuously negotiate academic freedom considering culturally and socially situated epistemic virtues such as objectivity and neutrality. Second, we introduce the notion of humility to revisit scientific knowledge production more generally and academic freedom in particular. Finally, we argue that practicing humility leads to enacting the university as an infrastructure of becoming otherwise, thereby enriching our understanding of universities as distinct and highly complex social spaces with a logic of their own. (shrink)

Parte-se da idea de que as territorialidades contra-hegemônicas no mundo rural são resultantes de um duplo processo de aprendizagem e/ou adaptación: um interno ao próprio território, resultante da coevolução entre ecosisstemas e comunidades, e outro externo e entre territórios –o que envolve os processos de territorialização do capital sobre territórios tradicionais. Estas dinâmicas adaptativas dos territórios tradicionais e alternativos são expressas em hibridismos de práticas e representações sociais modernas e tradicionais acerca dos atributos reprodutivos da natureza: a fertilidad da natureza (...) nos territórios tradicionais subsume a reprodutibilidade do complexo socioambiental, ao passo que o imaginário de natureza na cultura científica moderna subsume a produtividade objetivada dos ecossistemas. Em outros termos, trata-se de interpretar narrativas e políticas de natureza. De fato, o entendimiento da complexidade da reprodução socioterritorial da agricultura e pesca tradicionais e alternativas (como aquelas da agricultura familiar de base ecológica) subsume, portanto, a indissociabilidade dos aspectos objetivos e subjetivos acerca da reprodutibilidade de sistema produtivo lato sensu, ou seja, dos condicionantes geoecológicos locais, dos valores e simbolismos tradicionais, que são sintetizados nas estratégias de adaptação e resiliência das comunidades rurais frente aos projetos de (re)territorialização do Capital sobre aqueles territórios contra-hegemônicos. (shrink)

Background: The field of voice and speech analysis has become increasingly popular over the last 10 years, and articles on its use in detecting neurodegenerative diseases have proliferated. Many studies have identified characteristic speech features that can be used to draw an accurate distinction between healthy aging among older people and those with mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease. Speech analysis has been singled out as a cost-effective and reliable method for detecting the presence of both conditions. In this research, (...) a systematic review was conducted to determine these features and their diagnostic accuracy.Methods: Peer-reviewed literature was located across multiple databases, involving studies that apply new procedures of automatic speech analysis to collect behavioral evidence of linguistic impairments along with their diagnostic accuracy on Alzheimer's disease and mild cognitive impairment. The risk of bias was assessed by using JBI and QUADAS-2 checklists.Results: Thirty-five papers met the inclusion criteria; of these, 11 were descriptive studies that either identified voice features or explored their cognitive correlates, and the rest were diagnostic studies. Overall, the studies were of good quality and presented solid evidence of the usefulness of this technique. The distinctive acoustic and rhythmic features found are gathered. Most studies record a diagnostic accuracy over 88% for Alzheimer's and 80% for mild cognitive impairment.Conclusion: Automatic speech analysis is a promising tool for diagnosing mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease. The reported features seem to be indicators of the cognitive changes in older people. The specific features and the cognitive changes involved could be the subject of further research. (shrink)

This research aims to examine access to medical treatment during the COVID-19 pandemic for people living with disabilities. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the practical and ethical problems of allocating limited medical resources such as intensive care unit beds and ventilators became critical. Although different countries have proposed different guidelines to manage this emergency, these proposed criteria do not sufficiently consider people living with disabilities. People living with disabilities are therefore at a higher risk of exclusion from medical treatments as physicians (...) tend to assume they have poor quality of life, whereas access to medical treatment should be based on several parameters, including clinical data and prognosis. However, the COVID-19 pandemic shifts the medical paradigm from person-centred medicine to community-centred medicine, challenging the main ethical theories. We reviewed the main guidelines and recommendations for resources allocation and examined their position toward persons with disabilities. Based on our findings, we propose criteria for not discriminating against people with disabilities in allocating resources. The shift from person-centred to community-centred medicine offers opportunities but also risks sacrificing the most vulnerable people. The principle of reasonable accommodation must always be considered to guarantee the rights of persons with disabilities. (shrink)